January/February 2001 | Contents

Trying to Scale the 'Impenetrable Wall'

BY LONNIE ISABEL

The 2000 campaign will most certainly be remembered for what happened after the polls closed November 7. What may already be forgotten is what happened in the long months that preceded the vote: the candidates' well-planned inaccessibility. This strategy achieved the parties' goal of getting their message across, but resulted in some important issues' never being joined in national debate.

Governor George W. Bush and Vice President Al Gore stuck tightly to the "message of the day" (often with school children as props), and seldom had full-fledged press conferences. They responded with war room intensity to charges and negative stories, through instant e-mail campaigns, heated responses by surrogates on political talk shows, and through deft maneuvering to turn the story back on the other candidate.

That the modern campaign for president is essentially the province of spinners and image-makers is hardly new. And it isn't surprising that two candidates, both in need of image doctoring, would depend heavily on the fixers who control how a candidate presents himself, through the press and campaign ads, to the electorate.

The 2000 campaign was reminiscent of another one involving a Bush and Gore. In 1988, George H. W. Bush was elected over Michael Dukakis, who had vanquished Al Gore and other Democrats in the primaries. Bush had few press conferences, and attacked Dukakis with ads that have come to define negative campaigning (Willie Horton and the footage of Dukakis, helmeted, in a tank). And he had a light schedule of public appearances. After that campaign, some in the press vowed to get beyond the sound bite as a mainstay of political reporting. Several political reporters and editors say now that despite some improvements, there is still much work to be done.

A campaign veteran, Susan Page, USA Today's Washington bureau chief, believes the press did a much better job than in 1988, with the proliferation this year of ad watches and aggressive examinations of the candidates' policy proposals. But she says the candidates themselves were surrounded with a virtually impenetrable wall: "The candidates were both inaccessible. They didn't put themselves in uncontrolled contexts. Bush did early on and then he stopped. Gore never did. There were very few press conferences and no easy access."

Craig Gordon, of Newsday's Washington bureau, covered both Bush and Gore at times on the campaign trail. It was his first presidential campaign. "What struck me very early on was how the campaign is structured to force you to write the story of the day," Gordon says. "Most days there were four events and you had one hour to write the story, sometimes on just one of the events. It was hard to find time to talk with people, to put things in a context. It was incredibly frustrating."

When the candidates directly answered questions, those queries came from a pre-screened group of citizens, often party partisans, or a group of local reporters, while the traveling press watched. Each team had dozens of strategists, pollsters, and media advisers. Bush's top strategist was Karl Rove. Gore's team included his daughter, Karenna Gore Schiff, the feminist author Naomi Wolf, Carter Eskew, and Robert Shrum (see box).

They had their work cut out for them. Both candidates had much to overcome. Robotic, distant, and sometimes pedantic, Gore had to distance himself from years of Clinton scandal and show he had the capacity to establish a personal connection with voters. Bush had to address whisperings about past drinking and drug use, and had to prove that he was smart enough to be president.

Enter the press corps. The coverage of presidential campaigns has always been a monumental task for news organizations. And there are discouraging indications that readers and viewers aren't paying attention commensurate with the media's efforts. All but the largest organizations cover presidential campaigns part-time. It can cost as much as $10,000 a week to keep a reporter with a presidential candidate.

This presents a dilemma for those news executives with more limited budgets than the national newspapers and the networks. Do you keep reporters off the expensive press planes and risk not getting the familiarity with a candidate and his key staff members that could be invaluable in covering a big story? Do you just report on a candidate's background and issues? Can you do some of both? How much of each?

 

THE MARKETERS

ROBERT SHRUM Notorious political brawler and wordsmith who, as much as anyone other than the candidate himself, put words in Gore's mouth. Dubbed the poet-goon by the National Review, Shrum wrote speeches for Muskie, McGovern, Ted Kennedy, and Clinton, and reportedly had a hand in Gore's much-praised concession speech. CARTER ESKEW Worked with Gore at The Tennessean, and has massaged the message in nearly every Gore campaign. Known as the creator of simple, powerful ads. Credited with bringing focus to Gore's flailing primary campaign, and going negative on Bradley. KARL ROVE Known as a ruthless competitor and disciplined message meister. Tethered to Bush political fortunes since he went to work for George W.'s father in the '70s. Reportedly seasoned early when a young JFK fan (and a girl) popped eight-year-old Rove -- a Nixon man -- in the eye. Nurtured Bush's "nice guy" image; sometimes called "Bush's brains."

Walter V. Robinson, assistant managing editor of The Boston Globe, calls the traveling campaigns "hermetically sealed cocoons." He thinks there is little value to being on the press plane. And he is strongly critical of some reporters on the "fuselage beat" who have become talking heads on television political forums. "The big political reporters who used to cover politics tough are now a part of the system," he says.

Robinson, now head of the Globe's investigative team, wrote some of the toughest stories of the 2000 campaign. He uncovered evidence that Bush sidestepped duty in the Air National Guard for months during 1972 and 1973, and wrote the story that embarrassed Gore for exaggerating the cost of medicine for his dog.

"If there were 1,000 journalists working full time, there was a tiny, tiny group of reporters doing any serious scrutiny of the backgrounds of the candidates," he says.

Others say covering the campaigns up close is the only way to get a fix on the candidates. "It's hard to cover a campaign from your desk," says Bernard Shaw, CNN's principal anchor and co-host of the network's daily Inside Politics program. Shaw, who is leaving CNN in February to write and spend more time with his family, says that campaigns have always been carefully controlled and that it is up to reporters to "end run" them. "Campaigns are not in the business of making news," Shaw says. "They are in the business of glorifying the candidate."

From a candidate's perspective, the task is sometimes as simple as getting people's attention. It's a full-time, cost-laden job for almost two years. There are always potential landmines in the candidate's own words. Careful control is the goal of the campaign. This was never more evident than in our president-elect's most unkind description of a New York Times reporter that was not intended for broadcast.

National campaigns are fine-tuned to appeal to independent voters who ultimately decide the winner. Key words are repeated like mantras. Gore and Bush rushed eagerly toward the center, homing in on issues of taxes, Social Security, and education that appeal to an economically comfortable but worried group of voters.

Rachel Gorlin is a political strategist and Democratic political consultant who has seen image building from the inside. She said Gore and Bush had tremendous ground to make up in establishing themselves with skeptical voters and that they weren't particularly effective. "They had not very inspiring messages and they weren't very inspiring messengers," she says.

Gorlin says voters have such limited time that the campaigns have to stretch mightily for issues that will get attention. "That's why they talked so much about education," Gorlin says. "Everybody went to school. Education has staying power. People get it."

Despite the effort, neither candidate sparked much passion among voters. Bush was rejected by African-American voters nine to one, according to exit polls. Gore lost his native state, Tennessee.

Ex-candidate Dukakis, teaching at Northeastern University, says that under the circumstances Gore and Bush did very well in trying to win over voters: "I don't think they did so badly. No one knows how difficult it is to run for president until they've done it." He says Bush's team was better at presenting an image of Gore that, though incorrect, stuck. It was similar, says Dukakis, to what happened to him in 1988. "I was the bloodless technocrat and [Gore] was the guy who exaggerated. I ran against Gore in the primaries and had maybe thirty-nine debates with him. I never noticed that trait."

The campaigns run by Gore and Bush may be the model for the future. "I think we're going to see that happening more and more," Gorlin says. Page, of USA Today, has three recommendations: cover less of the campaign strategists' obsession on image; rely less on polling, particularly early tracking polls for daily stories; and continue to devote even more energy to ad watches and issues pieces.

Robinson, of The Boston Globe, says intensive scrutiny of candidates, their contributors, their past business dealings, and experience in government should be routine. The most obvious answer is to avoid the obvious as presented by professionals intent on projecting just that, the obvious. "You can't forget basic journalism," said Shaw. "Always strive to get it right."

Lonnie Isabel is national editor of Newsday.

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