Jonathan
Z. Larsen worked at Time magazine as an editor and correspondent
from 1965 to 1973, was editor of New Times from 1974 to
1978, when the magazine died, and The Village Voice from
1989 to 1994. He has written for New York magazine, Manhattan
Inc., and New England Monthly, as well as CJR.
The
press over the last forty years has been on a long roller coaster
ride, at least in terms of quality and content -- a fairly quick
ascent in the '60s and '70s, a plateau in the '80s, and then a
slow slide during the '90s into the present. Newspapers, magazines,
and television all rose and fell in different sequence, but they
more or less ended up at the same place at the same time.
And that place was a low point for many -- until September 11.
The journalistic performance that unfolded in early coverage of
the nation's worst disaster was nothing short of astonishing in
its thoroughness, its professionalism, its timeliness, its moments
of lyricism. It served as a reaffirmation not only of old-fashioned
reporting, but of the utility of the Internet, talk television,
and talk radio at a time of need.
The journalistic history of the past forty years has been filled
with fine performances in crisis but, particularly in recent decades,
that level has not been maintained. A few mass publications stand
out. The New York Times, now delivered across America, continues
to set the national agenda and steadily improves. The Wall Street
Journal, The Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times (except
for several years under a former General Mills executive) are
broad in scope and deep in their own specialities. There are some
very good regional papers -- The Oregonian in Portland, Newsday
and The Star-Ledger in the New York area, The Dallas Morning News,
The Boston Globe, the Chicago Tribune, and St. Petersburg Times,
to name some. The New Yorker, Harper's, and several smaller publications
remain significant voices for the new century.
But to some degree, even these publications face the same forces
that have haunted television and most mainstream magazines: a
desperate search for readers and viewers, marketing approaches
that corrupt the news process, and relentless pressure for profitability.
So the question remains: Have the media been transformed in some
permanent way by the events of September? Or will they soon return
to the hype and cynicism of recent years? The best way to begin
to answer these questions and begin to look forward at this point
may be to take a long look back.
THE '60s
In those exhilarating days my contemporaries and I, as in Lord
Lindsay's eulogy to his fellow Cambridge Olympians in Chariots
of Fire, had "hopes in our hearts and wings on our heels."
And the energy, God, the energy we had -- we vibrated with it.
We were in the spirit of the '60s in the freedoms we enlarged
and explored.
-- Willie Morris, New York Days
At the dawn of the '60s, the smartest reporting was still to be
found in magazines, and the media outlets that would best illuminate
the Cultural Revolution then under way were the smaller, more
intellectual titles: William Shawn's New Yorker; Harold Hayes's
Esquire, Robert Manning's Atlantic, and, later, Willie Morris's
Harper's. Joined by Life and The Saturday Evening Post in their
flameout years, they would lead the way into the '60s, offering
brilliant writing on the early years of the Vietnam war, the spreading
campus unrest, and the racial, sexual, and environmental politics
of the time. Writers like Norman Mailer, Joan Didion, David Halberstam,
and Tom Wolfe would rewrite the book on the war, on race, on the
culture, and on the very possibilities of magazine journalism.
In a single year, 1962, The New Yorker published two landmark
articles -- James Baldwin's essay on race, "Letter From a
Region in My Mind," which would be published in book form
as The Fire Next Time, and Rachel Carson's research into the effects
of DDT, later to be published as Silent Spring, a book that jump-started
the environmental movement and environmental journalism.
During the New York newspaper strike of 1962-63, which lasted
114 days, Barbara Epstein and Robert Silvers launched The New
York Review of Books, which ever since has added greatly to the
public discourse. The same strike would cripple some newspapers,
including the New York Herald Tribune, which folded in 1966. But
its Sunday magazine, which had helped pioneer the New Journalism
under Clay Felker, would become New York magazine, further energizing
the magazine field.
Most newspapers at the dawn of the Cultural Revolution, on the
other hand, had been sleepwalking. They were parochial, penny-pinching,
and politically compromised. By the late '50s, The Washington
Post and the Los Angeles Times had one foreign correspondent each.
The dailies seemed attracted to the poles of power: they were
either kingmakers or milquetoasts. Charles Taylor, the patriarch
of the family that owned The Boston Globe, insisted that the Globe
be "a cheerful, attractive, and useful newspaper that would
enter the home as a kindly, helpful friend of the family."
To keep the family peace, it had never endorsed a political candidate
in the twentieth century.
And then there was the Los Angeles Times, a newspaper that had
sponsored -- one almost wants to say created -- the Richard Nixon
who would years later try to shred the Constitution. In The Powers
That Be, David Halberstam argues that the Times had "created
in Nixon a sense that he could get away with things, that the
press was crooked and could be bought off." Another kingmaker,
Phil Graham, who represented the family interests at The Washington
Post, spent much of 1960 brokering a deal with John F. Kennedy,
to take Lyndon Johnson on as his running mate. "If anything,"
wrote Halberstam, "the disclosure that Graham had done this
did not hurt his reputation, given the values of journalism and
politics in those days, rather it enhanced his reputation as an
insider, a man of power close to power."
The state of the press was so dismal that journals of media criticism,
like this one, sprang up to shine some light on the profession.
Wrote James Boylan, the first editor of the Columbia Journalism
Review, upon the occasion of its twenty-fifth anniversary: "Most
discouraging for anyone contemplating the rise and fall of the
Republic was evidence that, when summoned to great tasks, the
journalism of the 1950s had proved far from adequate." Exhibit
A had been the reign of terror presided over by Senator Joe McCarthy
through the early '50s, largely unchecked by the Fourth Estate.
An evenhanded reportorial approach had simply managed to legitimize
and publicize his lies and slanders. McCarthy was stopped only
by his own deportment during the televised Army-McCarthy hearings.
The American people were finally face to face with the lunatic
that print journalists had been shielding from their view.
The work force of the press was, by and large, undereducated and
underpaid, mostly male, and extremely white. A Newspaper Guild
survey in the mid-sixties would find that there were fewer than
fifty blacks out of a total work force of 75,000 newsroom employees.
"Journalism was essentially a high working-class activity,"
noted James Fallows in Breakings the News. Indeed, the Nieman
Fellowship program at Harvard University was originally established
in 1937 because so many top journalists had never been to college.
The notion was to give them a taste of academia.
Nora Ephron would write that she was "physically revolted"
by the working conditions when she joined the New York Post in
1963. The response to her complaints was, in effect, "This
was the newspaper business. You want air-conditioning, go to work
at a newsmagazine. You want clean toilets, go to work in advertising."
(No doubt Reader's Digest did have clean toilets but, as Ms. magazine
would report years later, female Digest employees in some departments
had to ask permission to use them.)
But this was all about to change. A far younger, more idealistic
work force was knocking on the door. These ambitious, college-educated
journalists would exert an upward pressure for reform that would
be felt in almost every newspaper in the country. In The Kingdom
and the Power, Gay Talese would describe this pressure within
The New York Times as a "quiet revolution."
But the new cottage industry of media criticism and the restless
questioning of employees had less effect on the changes to come
than other factors -- the rigor of actuarial tables, the sheer
exigencies of the family dynamics within the controlling families,
and the happy circumstance of the right editors and publishers
taking their places at the right time.
In Los Angeles, Norman Chandler passed control of the Los Angeles
Times to his son Otis, who in turn threw considerable resources
behind the reforms engineered by Nick Williams, the paper's editor.
Richard Nixon was so appalled that he was being held to a higher
standard under the new regime that, upon losing his bid to be
governor of California in 1962, he delivered his famous "You
won't have Dick Nixon to kick around anymore" speech, aiming
his remarks largely at reporters of the Los Angeles Times. It
was one of those monster-to-Dr. Frankenstein moments. In a matter
of years the Times would take its place among the top papers in
the country.
During the early '60s, The New York Times would be transformed
by personnel changes. The Sulzberger family promoted the gifted
Abe Rosenthal to metropolitan editor, the beginning of a rapid
rise through the ranks, and at the same time installed two of
its own, Arthur Ochs (Punch) Sulzberger as publisher and John
Oakes, his cousin, to run the editorial page. Under Oakes, the
paper's spine stiffened noticeably on a host of issues -- civil
rights, the Vietnam war, and the environment among them. He would
conceive and launch the paper's op-ed page, a model that almost
every newspaper would follow.
At The Boston Globe, two sons would succeed their fathers, Davis
Taylor as publisher and Tom Winship as editor, and the paper shot
to the front ranks among the dailies. In 1966 the Globe won its
first Pulitzer and over the next fifteen years the paper would
win seven more. In Washington, following the suicide of her husband
Phil, Katharine Graham took over control of The Washington Post.
Her choice for editor was Benjamin Bradlee, and thus another editor/publisher
dream team was born.
This new cast of characters would take its place just as the country
began to combust internally. Perhaps no generation of editors
has ever faced a story lineup such as the '60s presented: the
Bay of Pigs fiasco, the Cuban missile crisis, the introduction
of ground troops into Vietnam, the assassination of the country's
youngest president. "JFK's ghost will haunt the corridors
of power in America for as long as the grass is green and rivers
run to sea," wrote Hunter S. Thompson some thirty years later.
It turned out to be simply the first of a series of political
assassinations that would trigger nihilistic violence and devastating
riots across the land.
"The center was not holding," as Joan Didion would famously
write in the pages of The Saturday Evening Post. "It was
a country of bankruptcy notices and public-auction announcements
and commonplace reports of casual killings and misplaced children
and abandoned homes and vandals who misspelled even the four-letter
words they scrawled."
The civil rights movement, which had been on simmer ever since
Rosa Parks's legendary 1955 bus ride in Montgomery, Alabama, came
to full boil by the '60s: from the Freedom Rides during the summer
of 1961; to the march on Washington, D.C., by Martin Luther King,
Jr. in 1963, and his historic "I have a dream" speech
before a mixed audience of 200,000; to King's assassination in
1968, after which the coalition of black civil rights figures
and white liberals began to unravel.
The black power movement, the feminist movement, and the gay rights
movement all began in the '60s. And a huge cultural story was
unfolding, with journalists running to keep up with it all: the
pill, introduced in 1960, opened the door to the age of sexual
liberation, and then licentiousness; the pop music scene, which
exploded in the wake of Elvis, would lay down the sound track
for the decade. The culture was changing so fast by 1969 that
journalists did double takes. Life would write two pieces in the
space of three weeks about Woodstock. The first, in photo essay,
would say how wonderful it was, some 400,000 beautiful young people
camping out under the stars. The second, by columnist Barry Farrell,
would say how frightening it all was that so many people could
so drug themselves that they sat through torrential rain, food
and water shortages, and lack of sanitation with barely a fistfight.
Both overshadowing and feeding this cultural revolution was the
Vietnam war, the brushfire that spread ever further the harder
the White House and Pentagon tried to "win" it. The
war would dominate the news for more than ten years.
How did the press do with this sprawling story lineup? In his
recently published history, The American Century, Harold Evans
looks back to issue this scathing indictment on the newspaper
coverage of the civil rights movement:
Nationally, with the exception of a few brave correspondents,
the most respected, relatively liberal organs like The New York
Times, Newsweek, Time, the New York Herald Tribune and The Washington
Post for years lackadaisically portrayed the deadly struggle for
rights as one more mildly amusing political game, with regular
winners, losers, leaders, and trailers.
Evans singles out for praise the civil rights reporting of David
Halberstam, writing in the mid-'50s for the Daily Times Leader
in Mississippi, The Nashville Tennessean, and a biweekly magazine
called The Reporter, but faults editorials in The New York Times
in 1961 that warned against extending the Freedom Rides of that
summer. Wrote the Times: "They are challenging not only long-held
customs but passionately held feelings. Nonviolence that deliberately
provokes violence is a logical contradiction."
The Kerner Commission, in its landmark report on race relations
in 1968, concluded that the media had failed to communicate "a
sense of the degradation, misery, and hopelessness of living in
the ghetto."
Television, as it did on every other issue during the '60s, played
a crucial role in civil rights, presenting firsthand evidence
as no other medium could, such as 1963 footage of black demonstrators
in Birmingham, Alabama, being attacked by Bull Connor's dogs and
hoses. TV provided quieter epiphanies as well. In his book, The
Sixties, Todd Gitlin writes about the black witnesses who testified
before a televised credentials committee hearing at the 1964 Democratic
party convention in Atlantic City: "Thanks to live television,"
says Gitlin, "previously voiceless people were able to speak
to America over the heads of the usual managers." A black
woman named Fannie Lou Hamer, who had been thrown in jail when
she tried to register voters in Mississippi, began to narrate
how the police had forced a black male prisoner to beat her with
a blackjack. When that prisoner tired, another was ordered to
take his place and continue the beating. "It was irresistible,
uncensored television," says Gitlin, "and one of the
people who thought so was Lyndon B. Johnson." So worried
was the president about the effect of Hamer's testimony that he
called an impromptu press conference. The cameras dutifully cut
away from Hamer.
The following year, 1965, Johnson would sign the Voting Rights
Act, and he would soon sign two other major civil rights acts
outlawing discrimination and offering protection to movement activists.
It would be too much to say that the media had inspired Johnson
to these reforms, but certainly the media played a pivotal role
in preparing the country to accept them.
As to the tangled web of Vietnam, how good was the reporting on
the war? The answer is that the reporting was brilliant, courageous,
and prescient. And at the same time it was shortsighted, timid,
even corrupt. In the introduction to a book of poems entitled
Song of Napalm, Robert Stone has written: "Wars are meant
to be forgotten, the Vietnam war like any other. Memory resists
them. Their reality bleeds away, surviving in fragments."
The fragments of reporting that survive the Vietnam war and sit
now on library shelves are the very best. I had the privilege
of reviewing one collection for this magazine when it was published
in 1998, the two-volume set published by the Library of America
called Reporting Vietnam. And I was stunned all over again at
how well the reporting held up, how accurate and dispassionate
it had been.
But this is only half the story. Pieces like these took weeks,
sometimes months, to report. And while the best reporters were
out reporting them, some of their fellow journalists back in Saigon
-- wire service and newspaper reporters left to file daily stories
-- were dutifully reporting worthless accounts drawn from Pentagon
and embassy briefings, skeletal dispatches full of armaments fired
and sorties flown and prisoners killed, stories that captured
very little truth and almost no narrative. It was a regular conveyor
belt of disinformation and, incredibly enough, much of it ended
up on the front pages of the country's newspapers. On top of that
was the voluminous reporting from stateside Pentagon correspondents,
State Department correspondents, and White House correspondents,
most of whom quoted government officials dutifully and reinforced
the party line.
Nor can one forget the role of Time magazine, which fielded exceptional
correspondents during the early '60s and then not only changed
the meaning of their files so that they would fit into Harry Luce's
political construct, but also criticized its reporters by implication
if not by name in its own press section. While Newsweek was taking
an increasingly skeptical line in the war, Time by 1965 was declaring
"a turning point." Life was also thrown into the war
effort, serving as a platform for an editorial by Hedley Donovan,
then editor-in-chief of Time Inc., who returned from a trip to
Vietnam in the same year to reassure the nation that we were winning.
Time changed its official policy by the late '60s, but even in
1970-71, when I was serving the magazine as its Saigon bureau
chief, the pattern of tipping stories toward establishment sources
continued. Writers in New York jokingly referred to the magazine's
Pentagon correspondents as the Panzer division and to those of
us in Saigon as the "flower children." In many a dispute,
the Panzer division rolled over the flower children.
The same phenomenon applied to television coverage. Working in
Vietnam as a television reporter was incredibly difficult because
one had to get not only the story but also the film, and that
meant dragging around a camera crew for days at a time, often
with little to shoot. Thus the remarkable footage of the war that
people remember was intermittent, while talk on the evening news
about the war, from White House, State Department, and Pentagon
officials, was constant.
Even so, the power of those memorable pieces of TV war reporting
was searing, and no doubt did as much to turn public opinion around
as all the print put together. Take, for instance, a Morley Safer
report from South Vietnam in 1965. Halberstam tells the story
in The Powers That Be: Safer gets a tip about a Marine action
near a series of villages outside of Da Nang called Cam Ne. He
and his crew accompany the soldiers as they enter the village.
The soldiers fire their guns, but no one fires back. Three marines
end up shot in the back, all by their own men. Enraged, the marines
take the village by storm, setting fire to thatched huts and "throwing
in grenades and using flame throwers in holes where civilians
were cowering and where they would be either burned to death or
asphyxiated."
Reading the words now, or even reading words like them back then,
is one thing; but seeing the film is another. When Safer's footage
arrived stateside, CBS officials broke into cold sweats but put
the footage on the evening news.
Viewers were horrified, none more so than LBJ. The next morning
the president called CBS president Frank Stanton, a friend, and
said: "Frank, this is your president, and yesterday your
boys shat on the American flag." Safer's report was, Halberstam
would write, "the end of the myth that we were different,
that we were better."
THE '70s
We had started off okay with the Freedom Riders and Woodstock
and Four Dead in Ohio and driving Nixon from office and Jon Voight
in Midnight Cowboy and so on. But then we hit a rough patch. We
became crass and self-absorbed. We stopped caring about anything
but money and food.
-- Joe Queenan, Balsamic Dreams
The '70s was a great decade for the media, and a dreadful one
for the country. As journalists scored one reportorial coup after
another -- My Lai, the Pentagon Papers, Watergate -- the culture
itself continued to unspool. Every indicator portended trouble.
If, as Weekly Standard writer David Frum writes in How We Got
Here, the first sixty years of the twentieth century had been
"an ever-more successful attempt to impose order on a recalcitrant
world," then the next twenty represented a retreat into chaos.
Some time after 1965, crime shot up, and would continue to do
so until the early '90s; illegitimacy and divorce, drug use, wanton
violence, political corruption, all rose in steep ascents.
Pop idols began to keel over from overdoses -- Jimi Hendrix, Janis
Joplin, Elvis Presley, Lenny Bruce, Brian Jones. More and more
people would cheat on taxes, skip work without notice or reason,
and sabotage assembly lines. The pox of Vietnam, symbolized by
soldiers "fragging" their own officers, had come home
to infect the country at large with a virulent anarchy.
The melting pot was no longer working properly; we were one nation,
divisible. The country fell not just along racial lines. In 1973,
the Supreme Court, in Roe v. Wade, gave women the legal right
to abortions, capping a decade of growth for the feminist movement.
But the ruling, far from settling the dispute over reproductive
rights, only inflamed it.
In almost every way, the country was near bankrupt -- financially,
morally, and spiritually. By 1975, even New York City could not
pay its bills. Cults were growing like fungi in a dank crawlspace.
In 1978 more than 900 followers of the Reverend Jim Jones in Guyana
would die from a suicide cocktail of Kool-Aid and cyanide. Five
people were shot and killed trying to reach the victims, including
three journalists.
"Between 1967 and 1981," writes Frum, "the United
States sank into a miasma of self-doubt from which it has never
fully emerged." But the country's dissolution would not infect
the media until the second half of the decade. There were major
national stories to report, and the press was reporting them brilliantly.
The decade began with continuing coverage of the My Lai massacre,
first reported by Seymour Hersh through Dispatch News Service
in the fall of '69, for which he won a Pulitzer Prize. There followed
Neil Sheehan's coup in obtaining the Pentagon Papers and The New
York Times's subsequent publication; Sydney Schanberg's courageous
reporting for the Times on the fall of Phnom Penh and the bloodbath
that followed; and The Washington Post's tenacious, trail-blazing
pursuit of the multi-faceted Watergate scandal, backed up by additions
to the story line from the Los Angeles Times, The New York Times,
and Time magazine, to name a few.
It is doubtful that the Pentagon Papers would have been published,
or the Watergate story pursued with such determination, had not
an era of close relations between newspaper owners and managers
and the White House come to an end. The protectiveness of the
press toward the presidency from the '40s through the '60s is
now part of press lore -- the photographs that never showed FDR's
braces, the never-disclosed knowledge of JFK's trysts, The New
York Times's self-censorship of its own Bay of Pigs coverage,
the Times's cooperation a year later during the Cuban missile
crisis. This collaboration with the seat of power sprung quite
naturally from a wartime (hot and cold) sense of enhanced patriotism,
not to mention awe for the presidency and an instinct to protect
it. In his book, Thy Neighbor's Wife, Gay Talese describes a memo
that Hugh Sidey, a top Time Washington correspondent, wrote to
his editors, a for-your-eyes only communication never meant for
publication, which likened the hedonism of JFK's White House to
ancient Rome. Somehow, the memo found its way to Robert Kennedy,
who summoned Sidey and threatened a suit for slander, whereupon
an equally irate Sidey lectured the attorney general, "I
don't think that this is the way the government should be run."
The public remained in the dark.
The familiarity between presidents and eminent publishers, editors,
and journalists of the day fostered back-channel communications,
usually well out of sight of the newsroom. If press managers resisted
the entreaties successfully, they would make the fact known and
become momentary heroes. If they succumbed, one might never hear
of it. One thinks of Kennedy's 1963 sit-down in the White House
with Punch Sulzberger and Scotty Reston to complain about Halberstam's
reporting from Vietnam, or that phone call from LBJ to Frank Stanton
at CBS about Morley Safer. As the decade progressed, however,
publishers and editors became more inured to these entreaties.
In 1970, Henry Kissinger tried unsuccessfully to get Max Frankel,
then Washington bureau chief of The New York Times, to mute the
reporting of the secret resumption of bombing of North Vietnam.
The White House had already announced its "incursion"
into Cambodia (the event that triggered the protests at Kent State
in Ohio that resulted in the death of four students), but the
bombing broke a deal with Hanoi to begin negotiations. According
to Frankel's memoir, Kissinger told him, "Max, if you blow
this up, you will be doing a grave disservice to the national
security -- with all that is going on." Frankel blew it up
and blew Kissinger off.
The subsequent publication of the Pentagon Papers made a clean
break. The New York Times managed to publish three days' worth
of the forty-seven-volume study of the war in 1971 before a court
issued a restraining order, whereupon they were passed along to
The Washington Post and then The Boston Globe like a hot potato
until the restraining order was lifted. Being sued by the federal
government was a terrifying prospect, and the publishers involved
showed every bit as much courage as the journalists.
When word came down from the Supreme Court that the publication
of the Pentagon Papers represented no threat to national security,
and that the prior restraint had been unjustified, there was celebrating
in the newsroom. According to The Trust, a history of the Times
by Susan Tifft and Alex Jones, "Punch and Rosenthal heard
the news in New York on an open telephone to the court and spontaneously
hugged each other. 'Get some champagne quick, because we're drinking
it like mad here,' Rosenthal telegrammed Frankel in Washington."
The court battle over the Pentagon Papers had been a trauma for
all concerned. Certainly the press would not regard Nixon in the
same way afterward, and for his part Nixon created the plumbers
to seek revenge on the man who had leaked the papers in the first
place, Daniel Ellsberg, one of the many authors of the study.
Thus it truly was one big story: the Vietnam war begat the Pentagon
Papers and the Pentagon Papers begat Watergate.
Watergate was a difficult enough story for the print media, and
for television next to impossible. There were few images; sources
would not appear on camera, and most of what was known had to
be attributed to The Washington Post. Then, too, the back channel
with the White House was still effective at the networks. The
licenses of their lucrative stations were periodically reviewed
by the government. At CBS, a planned two-part Watergate series
by Walter Cronkite suddenly became a one-and-a-half part series
-- the second installment was cut from fourteen minutes to eight
minutes -- after a vicious tirade from White House aide Chuck
Colson. According to Halberstam's account, Colson was not satisfied.
After Nixon's reelection, he told CBS president Frank Stanton:
"We'll break your network."
By the time the Senate committee hearings on Watergate began in
1973, the Post had already won its Pulitzer Prize. But it was
left to television, doing little more than clearing the schedule
and rolling the cameras, to deliver the coup de grâce. The
nation would be transfixed by the hearings, as it had been during
the McCarthy hearings, as it would be during the Clinton impeachment
hearings. By 1974 Nixon was gone, airlifted into oblivion.
The story was over, but the dramatic postscript was not written
until April 1975, when other helicopters would airlift hundreds
of American State Department officials, civilians, and Vietnamese
off the roof of the embassy in Saigon. Keyes Beech, a reporter
for the Chicago Daily News who had lived in Saigon for nine years,
had to fight his way to the embassy, "scratching, clawing,
pushing ever closer to the wall. We were like animals." Finally,
he was in the air and looking back. "My last view of Saigon
was through the tail door of the helicopter," he would write.
"Tan Son Nhut was burning. So was Bien Hoa. Then the door
closed -- closed on the most humiliating chapter in American history."
In the short time it took Beech's helicopter to reach the deck
of the USS Hancock, Saigon had been renamed Ho Chi Minh City.
The public would reward print journalism for all of its good work
with increasing distrust. The media had done what they were supposed
to do -- report the news "without fear or favor." But
the news had been so unremittingly bad that the public held the
media, and the printed media in particular, responsible. It wasn't
just that the messenger was being blamed. Journalists were perceived
by some as out of touch with mainstream attitudes -- an excessively
liberal elite based in New York and Washington. Readership declines,
brought on by alternative media choices, and by failures in the
educational system, added to newspaper woes. By the '70s television
had already replaced newspapers as the most trusted communications
medium. In the mid-'60s, 80.8 percent of the adult population
read newspapers. By 1997 that figure was down to 58.3 percent.
Still, because of population growth, newspaper circulation was
increasing, as were advertising revenues, thanks to the purchasing
power of the Boomer generation that was entering its twenties
and thirties. Between 1960 and 1970, newspaper advertising revenue
increased from $3.6 billion to $5.7 billion. Over the next ten
years it jumped to $14.8 billion.
Throughout the '50s and '60s, the newspapers' profit margins,
when there were any, seldom rose above 5 percent. But by the mid-'70s,
the unions had largely lost their chokeholds on the industry.
Labor-saving composing and printing technologies were introduced
and profit margins began to increase. The newspaper industry was
now big business, and attractive to Wall Street investors. Family-owned
papers like the Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, and The
Washington Post, which had already gone public, found themselves
under pressure to increase profits and stock prices. And those
public companies that didn't have family control felt the pressure
even more. Professional managers began to move in, and with them
marketing consultants and accountants who knew little and cared
less about the values of journalism. In his memoir, Max Frankel
tells of how he had to fight off the business side of the Times
to keep the Book Review alive:
Since the advertising revenue that the Review attracted consistently
failed to cover the costs of its production and staff, the 'return-on-investment'
crowd foresaw profit in its elimination, or at least significant
shrinkage. They never bothered, of course, to measure the contribution
that even an 'elitist' Review made to the sale and cachet of the
whole Sunday paper.
The Washington Post was responding to the marketplace and social
forces when it started Style in 1969. No longer able to deliver
the news first, papers looked for new ways to hold readers. And
so they entered the era of "personal" rather than "official"
coverage -- often useful service information but at times frivolous
in the extreme. Style replaced "For and About Women,"
ending that traditional segregation by gender. Many newspapers
around the country adopted a similar approach. The New York Times,
traditional pacesetter for hard news, went to a section-a-day
format, and came under fire for what to some seemed excessive
coverage of the unimportant.
That newspapers had crossed some sort of line became clear in
November 1975 when the Times put on its front page an article
by its food writer, Craig Claiborne, about a $4,000 meal he and
a friend had enjoyed at a Paris restaurant, paid for by American
Express. Nora Ephron would call Claiborne's article "terminal
decadence" in her Esquire media column, arguing that the
Times "had managed to give front-page play to a story that
was essentially a gigantic publicity stunt for American Express."
The letters poured in, running four to one against the article.
What upset Ephron and many other journalists even more was the
advent of celebrity journalism, first promulgated in a "legitimate"
publication with the launching of People magazine by Time Inc.,
in 1974. Within two years, it was profitable and would go on to
change the media landscape, as celebrity profiles began to spread
like kudzu. Newsweek would eventually run a cover story on Vanna
White, the woman who spun the wheel on Wheel of Fortune. (At the
magazine I was then editing, New Times, we protested the genre
with a cover photograph of Farrah Fawcett and a line that read:
"There is Absolutely Nothing in This Issue about Farrah Fawcett."
Fawcett, then a television actress appearing in Charlie's Angels,
has remained a staple of celebrity journalism to this day.) Writing
about People magazine, Ephron would bemoan the fact that all of
this "lowest common denominator" reporting "has
to be at the expense of the issues and events and ideas involved.
It seems even sadder that there seems to be no stopping it."
One obvious problem with this new form of journalism was supply
and demand -- too many journalists chasing too few top-draw celebrities,
the sort whose cover image could sell magazines. Pretty soon the
subjects gained the upper hand and began negotiating terms to
reporters and editors. This was treacherous ground.
And to create drama, the lives of celebrities large and small
had to be cast in dramatic terms. Whatever the dullness of their
real lives, for the purposes of People and its competitors, celebrities
always had to be in motion, either up or down, coming back for
a reprise, or going down for the first time, anything but staying
the same. The publishers of these magazines, like stockbrokers,
could make money by touting celebrities or selling them short,
but not by holding. The best celebrities were therefore the most
dysfunctional, cycling through the valleys and peaks of their
lives.
It was a depressing time for journalism. The press was exhausted,
collectively and singly, no less than the nation itself. It was
a time for reflection and recollection, not to mention remuneration.
Willie Morris had quit early on in 1971 as editor of Harper's,
pressured by a magazine owner who wanted to see profits and didn't
give a fig for what Morris had accomplished. David Halberstam,
Neil Sheehan, Gloria Emerson, Jonathan Schell, Frances FitzGerald,
and Sydney Schanberg all turned to nonfiction books, most of which
were extensions of their reporting on the war. Ephron had switched
to screenwriting and film directing. Ward Just would turn to novels,
Norman Mailer would return to them. It was the end of an era.
THE '80s
The issue isn't just the loss of journalism. At stake is whether,
as citizens, we have access to independent information that makes
it possible for us to take part in governing ourselves.
-- Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel,
The Elements of Journalism
I first encountered marketing consultants in 1981, while working
as Life's news editor, a title that was not quite yet an oxymoron.
The big-format picture magazine, having folded as a weekly, had
been reborn as a monthly. Life relied heavily on newsstand sales
and impulse buys and had hired, like most every other publication
by then, consultants to guide its choices. By the time I joined
the magazine, the specialists had already seen enough to reduce
their advice to a coda: Life covers should stick to celebrities
and cuddly animals.
Animals were in ascendancy because Life had run a cover shot of
a Shar-Pei puppy, a Chinese guard dog with heavily wrinkled fawn-colored
fur and a lugubrious expression. The cover had been a huge hit.
I wanted to hug the dog myself. Still, there were hard choices
to be made. The best-selling celebrities were hard to bag, not
all animals were cute, and editors wanted to run covers on medicine
and science. The consultants set up their own newsstands throughout
the country to test out the three or four possibilities for each
month -- mock-up covers of Life would be interspersed with already
published magazines. Then the editors would sit rather sheepishly
to hear how poorly their choices fared, and why. Seldom was the
quality of the stories behind the covers addressed. One month,
I suggested that a story I was editing, on water issues across
the country -- depleted reservoirs, collapsing aquifers, and access-to-water
controversies -- be thrown into the mix. For a cover I proposed
some beautiful landscapes of California's Mono Lake, showing the
water level so low that it exposed otherworldly underlying salt
formations.
The consultants were incredulous; an emotionally cold landscape
would never fly. Nonetheless, other possible covers were falling
through. Mono Lake went on the cover and became one of the better
selling issues of the year.
I tell this small anecdote only to illustrate how much ground
editors had already ceded to "the suits" by 1981, and
how misguided the advice received often was. In the introduction
to Media Circus, a meditation on the failures and excesses of
the press published in 1993, The Washington Post's Howard Kurtz
writes,
In some ways we were the architects of our own misfortune,
sacrificing our credibility for a misguided notion of what sells.
Dumbing down the product has done nothing to stem the tide of
newspaper closings.
But editors and publishers, under increasing pressure from owners,
corporate executives, and stockholders, had lost their bearings
by the '80s and eagerly embraced advice from all comers. Surely
businessmen knew best. After all, they were the new rock stars
of the decade. Magazines like Manhattan, inc. had emerged to elevate
people like Donald Trump, the real estate developer, and Carl
Icahn, corporate raider to iconic status. Tina Brown, who was
thought to have captured the zeitgeist of the period in the pages
of Vanity Fair, would pick up her own pen to write about Saul
Steinberg, another corporate raider, and his wife Gayfryd, then
the toast of New York.
Editors were not only giving away much of their discretionary
power, but, as they huddled with consultants and pondered focus
groups, their time and attention. This would become such a fact
of life over the next two decades that by 1998 Geneva Overholser
could observe in the pages of American Journalism Review, "Walk
into any sizeable newsroom in the country, ask where you can find
the editor and chances are good the answer will be: in the Marketing
Committee."
It was a particularly trying time for the networks. In 1980, Bill
Paley had put CBS into the hands of an outsider, a Pillsbury executive
from Minneapolis named Thomas Wyman. Al Neuharth, the head of
the Gannett company, who would play a minor role in the drama
that was to follow, wrote in his memoir that Wyman was a "flustered
misfit" who was "totally lacking in knowledge or understanding
of the company he was running and the business we were in."
Over the next five years CBS's income was down and so was morale
in the news division.
By 1985, CBS was "in play," as were the other two networks.
No network had ever been sold, but now, within the year, they
would all lose their independence. CapCities acquired ABC; General
Electric took over RCA, the owner of NBC; and Paley, dissatisfied
with Wyman and fending off Ted Turner, turned to Laurence Tisch,
a major stockholder, who would then take over Wyman's job and
the network. Tisch took control and within three years, "the
Tiffany network" had gone from first to last place in the
ratings. Dan Rather would grouse on the op-ed page of The New
York Times about hundreds of employees who had lost their jobs
"so that the stockholders would have even more money in their
pockets." (Wyman would not be the last flour executive to
grease the skids at a franchise media corporation. Some fifteen
years later the Times Mirror board would make the identical mistake
and hire Mark Willes out of General Mills, Pillsbury's cross-town
rival.)
The effect of the "suits" was everywhere. The newsmagazines
began to pare down their international and national reporting
staffs while promoting and hiring writers skilled in life-style
and human-interest stories. There were more and more celebrity
covers. A study by The Project for Excellence in Journalism found
that Time and Newsweek were "seven times more likely to have
the same cover story as People in 1997 than in 1977." The
marketers had also introduced a new personal cover vocabulary,
which is now ubiquitous. Both newsmagazines pepper their covers
with the words "us," "we" and "you."
Thus one finds these lines on a cover of Newsweek this year --
"The Economy: How Scared Should You Be? The Market's Wild
Confidence is Shaky: What You Can Do Now?" And on Time, "How
to Protect Your Privacy Online: Identity theft is growing, spy
software is spreading. 10 ways to keep your vital information
secure."
Fifteen years or more of such pandering has done little to shore
up newsstand sales. Time and Newsweek now find themselves in danger
of slipping off the list of the top 100 magazines ranked by single-copy
sales. Both are outsold by Soap Opera Update. Meanwhile, the average
sell-through rate for all magazines on newsstands and on store
shelves has dropped from 65 percent in the early '70s to today's
figure of 35 percent. That's not good news for the business, or
for landfills.
Newspapers were also under increasing scrutiny from within and
without. More and more independently owned papers were succumbing
to the instant wealth offered by the newspaper chains. During
the '70s and '80s, Gannett would gobble up sixty-nine newspapers,
sixteen TV stations, and twenty-nine radio stations. The staffs
were then squeezed to make the purchases pay off, as their new
bosses began to look for profit margins of 20, even 25 percent.
Some of the most talented editors in the country would take a
hike. Bill Kovach left The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Jim Squires
left the Chicago Tribune, and Gene Roberts walked away from The
Philadelphia Inquirer, a paper he had guided to glory. All had
grown tired of playing milkmaids to the chains' cash cows. Squires
would conclude, "Enough would never be enough." Roberts's
leaving signified the beginning of a decline in Knight Ridder's
journalism, which had been among the nation's best.
The country's largest remaining independent papers were protected
from the chains in part by their size, and in part because family
members often held voting stock separately. But many third and
fourth generation stakeholders in family-run newspapers were also
getting restless, no longer content with single digit margins.
Managers turned to ever more sophisticated tools of quantification
and market research to squeeze profits. Writing in Republic of
Denial, Michael Janeway recalls that the news business of the
period rushed "as to a huckster's miracle cure to trendy
techniques for fragmenting its own products and markets."
Janeway, briefly editor of The Boston Globe, sat through his share
of meetings with media consultants, who fed back to the editors
the readers' complaints about the "bad and tedious news in
the paper, stories about chicanery, crime, governmental process."
In other words, newspaper editors were being encouraged by business
consultants to cut back on their beat coverage of federal, state,
and local bureaucracies. Many did so, and the consequences would
become apparent as the '80s advanced.
One factor that was forcing all newspapers into new directions
was the debut in 1982 of USA Today, conceived by Al Neuharth of
Gannett. The launch of a national newspaper was a huge gamble,
and the paper would not turn a profit for years, but its impact
was immediate. The use of color and graphics, breezy layouts,
and zesty headlines was a real departure from the norm, and shook
the industry. Newspaper executives either heaped scorn upon it
or rushed to copy it, but they could not ignore it. Jonathan Yardley
of The Washington Post wrote that USA Today was serving up fast
food, giving readers "only what they want." Ben Bradlee
added that if USA Today is a good paper, "then I'm in the
wrong business." The free publicity was just what Al Neuharth
needed. To his staff, he joked, "Bradlee and I finally agree
on something. He is in the wrong business." To the world,
he gleefully marketed the paper as McPaper.
With editors looking nervously over their shoulders, they began
to miss the stories that were right in front of them -- often
in the form of copy from their own reporters. It can be argued
that some of the biggest stories of the '80s were all hiding in
plain sight for years before they finally broke as big national
stories:
* Early signs of perfidy at the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) had been reported as early as 1982 by Kurtz
in the Post, yet the story never got out of the back pages. When
the Post took Kurtz off of the HUD beat in 1985, no one at the
paper replaced him. It would not be until 1989 that the nation
learned that the federal department responsible for housing the
poor had been ransacked by a bunch of wealthy, well-connected
developers.
* Ronald Reagan had indicated his near obsession with the Sandinista
government of Nicaragua continually in the early years of his
presidency. Within three months of Reagan's inauguration, the
contras were being trained in Miami; in 1983 congressman Edward
Boland, the Massachusetts representative who had sponsored the
amendment blocking covert aid to the contras, declared "the
evidence was very strong" that the law was being violated.
But the world would not know that anything was amiss until the
fall of 1986.
* The savings and loan story had been reported, but mostly on
a bank-by-bank basis in the financial pages, and the few reporters
connecting the dots were ignored. Shortly after the story finally
broke wide open in 1989 with a series in The Washington Post,
the bill had climbed to $500 billion.
* As for the AIDS epidemic, Frankel writes in his memoir that
The New York Times, like most American newspapers, "was inexcusably
indifferent to the early evidence of epidemic in homosexual ranks."
He adds, "The Times's interest in AIDS did not pick up until
after Rock Hudson died of the disease in 1985."
One reason why all of these stories were so slow to break was
the lack of television coverage. By now it had become axiomatic
that national news stories had to follow a formula: major play
in the most important daily newspapers, particularly The New York
Times, and then pick-up by television. The big stories of the
'80s took years to work their way onto the front pages of the
papers, and only then got any significant television play.
There was only one kind of story that immediately captured both
the front-page and the evening news: a human-interest story, and
preferably a political sex scandal. Kovach and Rosenstiel write
in The Elements of Journalism that "the press is increasingly
fixated on finding the 'big story' that will temporarily reassemble
the now-fragmented mass audience." More and more, this in
fact meant a small story with enough sex, sleaze, and racial or
political intrigue to keep it in the news for weeks or even months:
Gary Hart's affair with Donna Rice, O.J. Simpson's murder trial
and acquittal, the Elián González story, congressman
Gary Condit's alleged affair with Chandra Levy, and of course
the granddaddy of all news stories in the '90s, the Clinton sex
scandals.
THE '90s
Probably the most surprising aspect of the fall of the Berlin
Wall and the end of the cold war was the effect it had on the
American media executives; they seemed released from being serious
not just about foreign news, but in domestic reporting as well.
-- David Halberstam,
War in a Time of Peace
Harry Evans made an interesting decision in writing his large
picture book on the last one hundred years, called The American
Century. He ended the volume with the elder Bush's presidency,
adding only an Edward Sorel illustration of Bill Clinton's swearing-in
ceremony. This short-sheeting of the century was probably a wise
move. It meant that a tome full of the glory and tragedy of U.S.
history, and the country's role on the world stage, ends with
the collapse of the Berlin Wall and Operation Desert Storm, rather
than with President Clinton's tryst with Monica Lewinsky, the
stained blue dress, and some tawdry audiotapes. Would that the
rest of the media had sat out the Clinton years as well.
It is easy enough to argue that the period from 1993 to September
2001 represents a nadir in journalism.
What went wrong? The information revolution had such a nice ring
to it. There had been such promise.
Never before had journalists been so educated, so well paid, and
seemingly so representative of readers served. Never before had
journalists enjoyed such remarkable tools with which to do their
jobs -- lightweight laptops, cell phones, digital cameras, satellite
hookups, and instant research on the Internet. Never before had
they been presented with so many venues and formats through which
to deliver their information, with twenty-four-hour news channels,
media Web sites, and chat rooms. Never had newspapers seemed so
profitable. And television news, once the loss leader of the broadcast
industry, had proven itself a profit center as early as the '70s,
with the success of 60 Minutes.
Yet many of these strengths were either liabilities or illusions.
Journalists were better educated academically, but they were far
less educated in life. The media workforce was indeed more diverse
than it had ever been. In 1976, minorities had represented only
one percent of the 40,000 daily reporters in the U.S. Today the
figure is nearly 12 percent of the newspaper workforce and nearly
25 percent in television newsrooms. But those figures still lag
behind today's diverse population.
As for pay, some journalists were now pulling down six-figure
incomes, and a few stars had reached seven. Having helped to create
the celebrity culture, the face cards of the industry had themselves
evolved from observers to high-rolling players, no longer paid
to report what others did and thought but for what they themselves
thought. Thanks to what James Fallows calls the "political
talk industry," they were now ubiquitous, appearing not just
on endless TV roundtable discussions but also before industry
seminars and conferences. This "harlotry of the lecture platform,"
as John Updike has aptly described in Bech: A Book, did wondrous
things for journalists' egos and bank accounts but little for
the public discourse.
Part of the information revolution is the Internet. People are
using it as another source of news, and this is slowly eroding
the audience for traditional news sources. But it is turning out
that the most popular news sites are run by the traditional news
organizations. With few exceptions, stand-alone news sites, which
don't charge for usage, aren't making it.
The Internet has freed anyone who chooses to be a publisher without
any gatekeeper and that is wonderful for free speech but also
has a dark side: witness Matt Drudge. His 1997 false reports on
Sidney and Jacqueline Blumenthal were unsubstantiated, unchecked,
and just wrong.
Even the profitability of the newspaper business over the last
twenty years is a two-edged sword. The industry has gone from
single-digit margins to double-digit margins to some degree because
money is not being plowed back into the papers. Owners and newspaper
chain executives are not "putting more tomatoes in the soup,"
to use Abe Rosenthal's wonderful expression. Instead, the money
is going out the door, to outside stockholders, or up the chain
of command to stock-holding managers. The push for ever-higher
profit margins, sometimes as high as 25 percent, threatens to
erode the journalism being offered. Geneva Overholser, writing
in these pages, pointed out that newspaper profit margins increased
by about 50 percent, while readership has decreased 15 percent.
She goes on to write: "Poynter Institute's Al Tompkins says
he asked a drug-agent friend, in Tennessee, what percentage profit
crack dealers make. Around 25 percent, was the answer."
Within the television industry, the discovery that "news"
formats could be produced much more cheaply and profitably than
other programming has given rise to both the twenty-four-hour-news
and the news talk shows that largely fill the cable news day.
While these talk shows certainly have enriched the journalists
who participate, and presumably the cable operators who created
them, some have debased the profession. The worst of these shows
are sort of jumped-up gladiatorial contests that are in essence
"rigged," if not for profit as were the quiz shows of
the '50s, then for sheer entertainment. There are happy exceptions,
such as CNN's Greenfield at Large. But most are based on conflict
and hyperbole. Fallows writes in Breaking the News that the producers
of Crossfire are "shouting constantly in the earphones of
the hosts, 'Cut him off!' 'Interrupt!' This makes for lively talk
TV. But the culture of artificial polarization and overstatement
spills over into the rest of journalism." He quotes Margaret
Carlson of Time on her "simple rule for success" in
the new television talk show industry, as reported in The Washington
Post: "The less you know about something, the better off
you are."
These talk shows, combined with the new twenty-four-hour news
cycle, have created far too much "capacity" chasing
after far too little new information. It is my guess that when
television switched from fifteen-minute evening news broadcasts
to half-hour formats in 1962, there had been much hand-wringing
about whether there was enough real news to fill the slot. Often
there isn't (although there is plenty right now). Yet even so,
unmediated, unfiltered information, such as direct quotes from
public figures in the news, continues to shrink. The average length
of a television news sound bite in 1968 was forty-two seconds.
That had been pared down to what would seem an irreducible minimum
of ten seconds by 1988. In 2000, according to a study by the Center
for Media and Public Affairs, the average sound bite was down
to just over seven seconds.
The information revolution has many blessings, but its gift of
speed has a downside, as the Clinton sex scandal would prove.
The very impediments to newsgathering and transmission in years
past, the difficulty of composing the words -- manual typewriters,
setting type by hand -- and of delivering film, the time it took
for stories to reach the street, the intervals between newscasts
and paper deliveries all reinforced a process of deliberation
and second thoughts that once were ingrained into the communications
industry. Now it is journalism on the fly. There is barely a moment
for reflection.
In his memoir, Ben Bradlee writes,
But at the bottom of the barrel, the stain of the tabloids
was spreading with the help of television into what could be called
'kerosene journalism.' In this genre of journalism, reporters
pour kerosene on whatever smoke they can find, before they determine
what's smoking and why.
Over the years, one has heard a great deal about the chilling
effect that libel verdicts and prior restraint orders can have
on the media, and rightly so. But now the media, with its trumped
up atmosphere of conflict and hysteria, seems to be exerting something
of a chilling effect on government. Fallows, who calls the coverage
of the Clinton health care proposal "the press's Vietnam
war," says that government is all but held hostage by the
media, with no time to generate new initiatives in an atmosphere
of civil discourse. "Trying to carry out long-term plans
in this environment," says Fallows, who has served as a speechwriter
for the Carter White House and as editor of U.S. News, "is
like trying to conduct medical research in a hospital emergency
room: conceivable but unlikely."
The full effect of this Journalism with the Gloves Off is not
yet known. But it is interesting to speculate. In their book about
the coverage of the Clinton-Lewinsky affair, Warp Speed, Bill
Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel tell the story of how in 1964 J. Edgar
Hoover shopped audiotapes of Martin Luther King, Jr. around to
selected journalists. The tapes revealed that King, a married
man, was having an affair. Not a single reporter wrote the story.
"How different," the authors ask, "would American
history be had the press operated differently in 1964?" The
authors play it out a little further: "Imagine Hoover sharing
his tapes with professional Internet gossip Matt Drudge. How would
CNN handle the leaked tapes if the network knew MSNBC was about
to give the same information?" The same question can be asked
about the Cuban missile crisis, which was largely managed off-stage.
The story that would expose all the fault lines of the new media
was of course the Clinton presidency, and that began not with
Lewinsky but the moment he took office. Within the first days
of his new administration, Clinton nominated Zoë Baird for
attorney general. She was forced to withdraw when it was revealed
that she had employed an illegal alien as domestic help. Clinton
then nominated Kimba Wood, who was perceived to have a similar
problem, and also withdrew. Fallows reports what happened next.
"Less than two weeks after the new president was sworn in,
Sam Donaldson of ABC said on a weekend talk show, 'This week we
can talk about, 'Is the presidency over?'" Within months,
Time would run a cover called "The Incredible Shrinking Presidency"
and Newsweek would ask, "What's Wrong?" This sort of
press commentary seemed way over the top at the time, in part
because of the apparent hypocrisy involved -- how many of the
finger-wagging pundits also employed illegal aliens as housemaids,
cooks, and nannies? And then there was the issue of precedent
and proportionality. Less than three months after his inauguration,
John Kennedy ordered up the disastrous Bay of Pigs Invasion. It
had been a bad idea to begin with, and Kennedy managed to make
it much worse by watering it down until it had no chance of success.
The toll: 114 dead and an enormous international embarrassment.
Weigh the Bay of Pigs against Zoë Baird's and Kimba Wood's
illegal aliens.
But this is the new information age. Cheap talk is the coin of
the realm. And it never got cheaper (hopefully never will get
cheaper) than during the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal that broke in
1998. The following year, Kovach and Rosenstiel wrote in Warp
Speed what they believe the scandal represented for the press:
. . . the moment when the new post-O.J. media culture turned
its camera lens to a major political event for the first time.
What do we mean by post-O.J. media culture? It is a newly diversified
mass media in which the cultures of entertainment, infotainment,
argument, analysis, tabloid, and mainstream press not only work
side by side but intermingle and merge. It is a culture in which
Matt Drudge sits alongside William Safire on Meet The Press and
Ted Koppel talks about the nuances of oral sex, in which Hard
Copy and CBS News jostle for camera position outside the federal
grand jury to hear from a special prosecutor.
Sam Donaldson, he of the hair trigger, knew the repercussions
of the scandal before anyone else. He thought it was going to
be, well, about as devastating as Zoë Baird and Kimba Wood.
Four days after the initial reports Donaldson declared: "If
he's not telling the truth, I think his presidency is numbered
in days." After a few beats, Donaldson would speculate that
Clinton "will resign, perhaps this week."
In his introduction to Warp Speed, David Halberstam writes, "This
past year has been, I think, the worst year for American journalism
since I entered the profession forty-four years ago."
But the years 2000 and pre-September 2001 have hardly shown much
improvement. In 2000, the presidential election was badly bungled
in its final hours with premature network declarations of victory
for both Bush and Gore. Dan Rather would ruefully remark: "We've
lived by the crystal ball and learned to eat so much broken glass
tonight that we're in critical condition." The story that
got second billing for the year in terms of airtime and copy inches
was Elián Gonzáles, the young boy whose mother died
trying to bring him from Cuba to the United States. Elian's father
wanted him returned to Cuba; his relatives in Florida wanted him
to remain in the states -- a human-interest story that was blown
all out of proportion, and which may well have affected the presidential
election results.
The story this year that has received overwhelming coverage has
been the Gary Condit/Chandra Levy story, another apparently irresistible
combination of sex, politics, and crime reporting. The bewildering
coverage the story was given was accompanied by a considerable
amount of hand-wringing, self-examination, and self-justification,
surely a hangover from the Clinton scandal. Maureen Dowd of The
New York Times would feel compelled to write that the Condit story
was "the stuff of great drama and novels and journalism through
the ages," a story every bit "as legitimate as covering
the patients' bill of rights or campaign finance, maybe more so,
because here the press has a crucial role in forcing out the truth."
And when the reporters and talk show guests were not defending
the Condit coverage, they were attacking Dan Rather and the CBS
Evening News for not joining in the melee. Rather and his executive
producer, Jim Murphy, boycotted the story through much of July,
in what was seen by the rest of the media as an act of outrageous
moral grandstanding. For some like myself who were cheering on
the sidelines, however, Rather and Murphy had become Don Quixote
and Sancho Panza.
Stock analysts in days like these often speak of groping for the
true bottom of the market, something that must be reached before
the market can recover. It is not clear whether the media business
has reached its own true bottom, but I like to think it has. In
my opinion, that occurred in September 2000, at the very beginning
of Hillary Clinton's debate with congressman Rick Lazio, moderated
by the normally fair and estimable Tim Russert.
To kick off the debate, Russert turned to Clinton and asked her
if she was ready to apologize to the American public for "misleading"
statements made during the Lewinsky scandal. With that, he cued
up a videotape of the first lady on the Today show, six days after
the Lewinsky scandal broke, trying to defend her husband. The
impertinence of it, the unfairness of it, took my breath away.
It was as if a boxing referee had said, we are now going to have
a fair fight, and then hit one of the participants in the stomach
with brass knuckles. Apologize for what? For not testifying against
her own husband, something she could not even be forced to do
in court? One could only think of Joseph Welch's famous line to
Senator Joseph McCarthy during the Army-McCarthy hearings: "Have
you no sense of decency, sir, at long last? Have you left no sense
of decency?"
The tragic events of September 11 have changed the landscape for
the nation's media, as they have for its citizens and government.
The media's forced march toward banality and irrelevance -- compelled
by the economies of flagging audiences and profit-hungry media
conglomerates -- has not just been stopped but has been turned
around. Newsmagazines, adrift for years with covers on angels
and shark attacks, are selling news once again on newsstands,
and in numbers not seen in decades. CNN, reportedly on the brink
of trimming international coverage and hard news in favor of cultural
and Hollywood reporting, has scrapped the plan -- at least for
the moment.
This reordering of priorities and values has reached into almost
every outpost of the media. Now everyone is reappraising, recanting,
circling back to rediscover long dormant talents, passions, and
values. Over the summer, Tina Brown's Talk magazine ran a tasteless
fourteen-page photo fashion feature, using vamped-up models to
depict the president's twin daughters in bars, dance halls, and
police stations (in one photo, a George W. look-alike arrives
to bail the daughters out of jail). Now, trimming her sails to
the new prevailing winds, Brown could write of the intrepid Rudy
Giuliani and his all-but-forgotten marital woes: "His heroic
example, I hope, puts into perspective the late twentieth century
media hysteria about the relevance of a public servant's private
life."
The journalism of the past weeks has been both heartening and
alarming, heartening because journalistic infrastructures and
instincts seem to be alive and well, alarming because the stories
that came pouring out in the space of a few weeks were things
the country should have focused on years earlier, among them the
disintegration of the CIA; the internecine battles between federal,
state, and local agencies responsible for public safety and health;
the calamitous state of the country's airport security system;
the growing intensity and reach of anti-American sentiment among
Islamic populations, even within the United States. Had you read,
prior to September 11, that the Michigan laboratory responsible
for producing an anthrax vaccine had failed to ship a single dose
since it went private in 1998? I doubt it. And yet a clear threat
of bioterrorism has been with us for at least a decade, and high
on the list of possible weapons throughout that span has been
anthrax.
Were these the blown stories of the '90s, issues that had been
obscured by the media's focus on sex scandals and celebrities?
Some of them had in fact been reported before, but in the back
pages of newspapers, or in small circulation magazines that seldom
set the national news agenda. Too many major media outlets, driven
by little beyond quarterly profit statements, were otherwise occupied
by the cheapest stories they could find -- cheapest in every sense
of the word. Looking back, one wants to know: Did the country's
apathy dictate the media's slide from national and international
news reporting, or did the media's voluntary capitulation of its
societal role to report difficult, complex stories create an ill-informed,
uncaring audience? David Halberstam, writing in War in Time of
Peace, his new meditation on the failures of U.S. foreign policy
in the '90s, suggests that it was both: "The networks had
become essentially isolationist, or neo-isolationist, both reflecting
and at the same time increasing the nation's self-absorption."
Certainly recent developments have proved vindication for the
many voices in the wilderness -- several of whom have been quoted
in this essay -- that have decried the retreat from foreign reporting,
as well as from dogged beat reporting of the federal bureaucracy.
What remains to be seen is how long this recommitment to hard
news will last within the corporate offices of companies like
Disney, General Electric, and AOL, particularly as audience interest
inevitably begins to abate. Where will the balance between info
and tainment rest four months from now? Four years? Or forty?