VOICES
The
Spymaster Gets a Pass
By
Jason Vest
There used to be something
vaguely inspiring to me about the idea of confirmation hearings.
They seemed to hold the promise of journalistic nobility: not
only might a reporter bear witness to constitutional process,
but he or she might also scrutinize nominees and issues for the
public good. Unfortunately, this notion has been trumped in recent
years by the press’s embrace of a conventional wisdom that
holds that the president should be able to choose whomever he
wants for whatever position, and so the examination should be
perfunctory.
There are, of course, exceptions: the nomination
of federal judges can always have serious sturm-und-drang
showdown potential. The controversial Otto Reich might have provided
a serious hearing if the administration hadn’t found a way
around it last year. But considerations for positions in the national
security apparatus — so invigorated, post-9/11 — are
now more or less rubber-stamp affairs for both legislators and
reporters. For example, when Christina Rocca was appointed to
the State Department in 2001, no senator or journalist asked her,
let alone mentioned, anything about her fifteen-year Central Intelligence
Agency career. Yet even by that standard, things hit a new low
on February 27.
On that day, the Senate Armed Services Committee
convened to question the political appointee who would have responsibility
for orchestrating what may be the most ambitious, if not ominous,
consolidation of power in U.S. intelligence community history.
In anticipation of this event, I scanned the wires and watched
the channels for days before, during, and after. If anyone from
the press showed up to cover the confirmation hearing, there was
no evidence of it. Indeed, there was virtually no mention of the
event anywhere in the media.
Nominated to fill the position of undersecretary
of defense for Intelligence, Stephen A. Cambone — a Rumsfeld
loyalist rising rapidly through the Defense Department’s
senior ranks — didn’t even merit the undivided attention
of his overseers, but was wedged in with nominees for subcabinent
positions in the Energy and Army departments.
That was more than a little troubling. The gist
of Cambone’s brief turn before the committee essentially
boiled down to this: Trust me. Just because I’m going to
be the first person to have direct control over every defense
intelligence agency — NSA, NRO, NIMA, DIA, etc. — and
their budgets; even though I work for a secretary with a well-documented
history of Machiavellian power plays; even though I’m part
of a clique with a reputation for seeking the intelligence analysis
that meshes with its ideological goals — I certainly won’t
be a competitor to the director of Central Intelligence.
Cambone was essentially sent on his way with a pat
on the head, and subsequently confirmed — again, with no
substantial notice in the press — on March 7.
By the time The New York Times acknowledged Cambone’s
new billet as Rumsfeld’s intelligencer in the April 11 issue,
the newly minted undersecretary was full of muscularly cryptic
comments. Had the Pentagon hawks politicized intelligence in the
push for war with Iraq, the Times asked? "Any policy maker
has certain views," Cambone said. "Policy makers are
where they are and doing what they do because they have a view."
If there was a follow-up exchange seeking clarification, it wasn’t
included in the story. The Times went on to quote Cambone as saying
his job was "not to shape" analyses, but to properly
direct work. Any real difference between "shape" and
direct? Either not fit to print or not fit to ask.
All this was reminiscent of Cambone’s hearing
(along with other interested parties, I pored over the transcript
as soon it was available), in which restrained questioning by
the senators and creative use of language by Cambone left much
open to interpretation. In search of clarity, I rustled up Cambone’s
answers to a prehearing questionnaire put to him by the committee
staff. That document was far more illuminating.
Explaining his job as "exercising authority,
direction and control" of all Pentagon intelligence, Cambone
said that he would have total responsibility for all information
to be "collected, analyzed, and distributed," as well
as the "conduct" of buffed-up "counter-intelligence
operations." In the questionnaire, Cambone further noted
the need for database sharing between his intelligence operations
and civilian law enforcement, a move that is sure to give constitutionalists
pause. He wrote of the desirability of disseminating certain intelligence
analysis "without source attribution." And he discussed
how he would "consult, and coordinate . . . to ensure DoD-related
intelligence activity supports the goals" of Undersecretary
of Defense for Policy Doug Feith, to whom he would "ensure
timely delivery of intelligence information." (Critics call
Feith’s directorate the home of all manner of hidden and
ideologically motivated efforts since 9/11.)
Over the past couple of months, I’ve had numerous
conversations with retired and active intelligence officers (military
and civilian), staff people from watchdog nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) in the intelligence community, intelligence scholars, and
some congressional staff members. All agree that the new intelligence
undersecretary at the Pentagon is not only someone who bears watching,
particularly in a time when recent intelligence has been suspect,
but that, judging from the coverage surrounding his confirmation,
the press couldn’t care less.
