Publicity about the Mogarebi case [the exposure in 1977 of an Iranian brigadier-general as a KGB agent] grew into an international sensation in newspapers and magazines all over the world. In particular, the weekly magazines Time and Newsweek made great play with the story. At first we took every new item published as yet another blow from the enemy, but we came gradually to assess all that information with a more critical eye. The outcome was that the American special services, who were doubtless behind all the uproar, did an excellent advertising job for the KGB intelligence service.

Everything published proclaimed the incredible efficacy of KGB intelligence, saying that the KGB did not waste time on small fry, but only had agents among generals, members of government, and senior officers of Western intelligence services, and ran them, at a conservative estimate, for decades, paying vast sums for their collaboration. If something did go wrong, the KGB made every effort to rescue its agents . . . and much more in the same vein. As an example, the names of the British intelligence officers Kim Philby and George Blake were advanced, as well as that of Colonel Abel, the Soviet illegal who refused to reveal the names of "hundreds of his agents" after he had been arrested in the United States.

We could not have wished for anything better. If there was anybody in any country still in two minds about whether to collaborate with the KGB, then this sort of information would encourage a positive decision. A great deal of money, absolute security, rescue in the event of arrest -- what was there to think about? What was more, this type of advertisement could be used when insisting on the rigorous observation of scrutiny rules with active agents.

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